The commentaries on D. Westen, C. M. Novotny, and H. review suggest a number of questions, such as how an empirically informed clinician can integrate both applied and basic science into practice. The authors suggest recommendations for design and funding of psychotherapy research, including expanding the targets of intervention beyond categorical DSM-IV diagnoses, routinely comparing short-and longer term variants of experimental treatments, revising funding mechanisms to facilitate the study of treatments and follow-up assessments of appropriate duration for the problems they are targeting, requiring at least one "dissenter" on every research team, discouraging exclusion criteria other than those a reasonable clinician would use in everyday practice, creating funding mechanisms for developing and testing treatments in the community, and including practicing clinicians among reviewers of grant proposals.
The three commentaries provide a broad context for the target article (Westen, Novotny, Thompson-Brenner, 2004) , expanding and elaborating on some issues and raising questions about others. We first discuss some of the major points made by each, and then address the central question raised by all of them: Where do we go from here?
Basic Science as a Guide to Practice Goldfried and Eubanks-Carter (2004) provided an erudite description of the history of efforts to study psychotherapy and how as a field we got to where we are now. Their argument about different ways research can influence treatment-through basic, process, and outcome research-is a crucial one, given the current tendency to use the term empirically supported to refer to treatment guided exclusively by only one of these approaches (outcome studies). Indeed, one could argue that the focus on empirically supported therapies (ESTs) in clinical science has tended to offer clinicians a limited view of what science has to offer psychotherapy and has, paradoxically, linked practice to psychotherapy research at the expense of basic science.
For example, as Samoilov and Goldfried (2000) have noted, cognitive therapy may require fundamental changes to keep apace with developments in cognitive neuroscience. The evidence is now clear that many psychological processes are implicit and that implicit processes extend from memory and cognition to affect, motivation, and attitudes (e.g., Bargh & Barndollar, 1996; Westen, 1998 ; T. D. Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) . From a basic science standpoint, focusing primarily on explicit (conscious) cognitive processes or processes readily made conscious, such as automatic thoughts, is not likely to address many relevant implicit cognitive (or, for that matter, affective or motivational) processes. So should scientifically informed clinicians wait until someone develops a 20-session treatment for depression that adds a 4-session module on implicit associational networks? Or should they use the basic science research to inform their work now (e.g., making more use of questions such as "What comes to mind when you think of that?" to assess material associatively linked to a troubling thought, feeling, symptom, or experience that preceded a dysfunctional response)?
Or suppose a therapist treating a depressed patient discovers that the patient is afraid to feel hopeful in a new job or relationship, for fear that his or her hopes will be dashed (a common clinical phenomenon). Knowing what the therapist knows about basic science research on exposure and response prevention, should the therapist direct the patient to fantasize about some of those hopes and wishes and keep the patient focused on them, as he or she tries to escape them cognitively with one maneuver after another? Such an intervention might be well warranted in light of the basic science research on classical conditioning and avoidance learning, but the patient has a mood disorder, not an anxiety disorder. A graduate student in the most prestigious clinical psychology programs today would learn that the proper procedure is to treat the patient with cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) or interpersonal psychotherapy (IPT) and not to diverge from the manual on the basis of such clinical hunches. How and when a clinician should diverge from a manual on the basis of scientifically informed clinical judgment has never, to our knowledge, been clearly addressed.
These examples raise a crucial issue regarding the way the EST movement has implicitly or explicitly appropriated the debate on clinical versus statistical prediction. In the research literature on clinical versus statistical prediction, clinical judgment is typically compared with a formula developed over multiple iterations and samples, so that the formula is refined over time to maximize predictive validity. Under these circumstances, clinicians rarely beat the odds using their own intuitive algorithms, despite their common belief that their clinical judgment is likely to be a superior guide (Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Meehl, 1954) . A commonly voiced view today is that manual-based clinical work reflects statistical prediction, whereas divergence from manuals that have been empirically supported constitutes clinical prediction and should be avoided (e.g., G. Wilson, 1998) .
As applied to psychotherapy, however, our formulas are very primitive-and in precisely the ways Meehl (1954) argued are likely to render statistical predictors weak or premature.
1 If one were designing a measure to predict mania, one would draft a large set of items hypothesized to be potentially predictive (for theoretical, clinical, or empirical reasons), would apply them to a large sample to develop a regression equation, and would refine the equation by applying it to multiple samples to minimize error. This is precisely what has not been done in psychotherapy research. In research on depression, for example, researchers have not started with a large set of procedures and tested their association with outcome. Instead, they have simply picked two or three-primarily the two used in the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Treatment of Depression Collaborative Research Program-and shown them to be more effective for brief periods of time than control conditions. A better analogy to the clinical-statistical prediction literature would be to take an item set of 100 or 200 intervention and process variables and, over several successive samples, develop an equation using variables that predict treatment response for particular kinds of patients. We address below some of the complications of such an approach, but the point is that manuals represent a very imperfect operationalization of statistical prediction.
Further, the judgment about whether a given manual fits a given patient in everyday practice is, regardless of the clinician's ultimate conclusion, an example of clinical prediction in Meehl's (1954) sense-that is, relatively subjective, unstructured, informal, synthetic, and nonquantitative. Consider the case of a gay 42-yearold man who presents with moderate depression (Beck Depression Inventory ϭ 14). He is an extremely bright, successful entrepreneur with narcissistic features whose business is faring poorly during an economic downturn and whose romantic relationship of 8 years recently ended. The combination of these events left him feeling inadequate and unattractive. He thinks frequently about suicide but reports that he would never really kill himself.
Does the patient match the profile of patients who respond to CBT and IPT in controlled trials? The answer is ambiguous and depends primarily on the clinician's faith in both the results and generalizability of 2 decades of outcome research. One clinician might conclude that because CBT and IPT have the most data supporting them from RCTs for major depression, the treatments with the best available evidence should be used even though the patient does not quite meet diagnostic criteria. Another clinician might wonder how much of that evidence applies to this patient. What percentage of patients in these RCTs were highly intelligent, gay, or middle aged? What percentage had suicidal thoughts or prominent narcissistic features? What percentage had suffered a recent loss? To the extent that such patients were included in one RCT or another, were the Ns large enough to examine each of them as potential moderators? And what about nonlinear relationships, such as middle age treated as a category rather than as a point on a line midway between the 20s and the 60s? These are not inconsequential questions, and such variables would surely be included in any reasonable regression equation aimed at predicting outcome from intervention strategies. One could make a strong case that the clinician who chose to use a formula (adherence to a manual) in this case would be taking a very substantial leap from the extant data to its application to a case-a case that is not atypical in clinical practice.
Are Interventions Properties of Therapists, Patients, or
Their Interaction? Ablon and Marci (2004) offered an excellent review of a line of correlational research that both has challenged conventional wisdom about causal relations in RCTs for psychotherapy and holds promise for research linking process to outcome in naturalistic samples. They made two points worth highlighting here. First, it is difficult to induce even therapists in RCTs to practice specific, highly differentiable therapies for many disorders. As they observed, two treatments designed as radically different alternatives, such as CBT and IPT, may be reliably distinguished but nevertheless highly similar at the level of process (how the patient and therapist engage). (We add one caveat, namely that the disorders they have studied have tended to be those that violate most of the assumptions of EST methodology-although they are also the most common in clinical practice. We suspect that treatments for specific anxiety symptoms such as simple phobia or panic may be more differentiable; however, that is an empirical question.) The research Ablon and Marci described not only emphasizes the role of common factors in brief treatments of disorders such as depression (or perhaps factors common to therapies in which the clinician is under pressure to produce measurable change in 16 sessions, even if this precludes strategies aimed at identifying and addressing diatheses), but it also turns conventional wisdom about experimentation and causal inference in psychotherapy research on its head. When experimental manipulations last 12 to 20 sessions and comprise thousands of interventions, correlational findings may actually be more causally decisive than experimental results.
A second point worth highlighting is the importance of assessing not only the content of therapeutic communications (what is discussed) and the techniques the therapist uses (how it is dis-cussed) but also the process that emerges between patient and therapist. Ablon and Marci (2004) argued that the best predictors of outcome may not be what the therapist does or what the manual says the therapist does (or should do) but the emergent properties of the patient-therapist interaction. Their point is that one can miss crucial data if one treats interventions exclusively as properties of therapists (or manuals). The same set of behaviors on the part of the therapist may constitute different "interventions" depending on the way the patient responds to it and negotiates the therapeutic relationship. Insofar as manuals specify the therapist's role, they implicitly specify the patient's expected role as well (which usually means, as Ablon & Marci, 2004, noted, complying with the "coach's" game plan). Manuals do not, however, generate the "ambiance" in the room (much of which is measured by instruments that assess the working alliance), which tends to be more predictive of outcome than virtually any other variable, at least in brief treatments for disorders such as depression.
Making Better Use of RCTs
Haaga (2004) offered a thoughtful and balanced commentary about the ways we in the field may continue to learn from RCTs despite the problems with EST methodology. He raised a number of key issues worth addressing. One is the utility of exploring "high-priority procedural variables" (Haaga, 2004, p. 675) in RCTs, given that researchers cannot test all the variables that constitute a treatment package. In many respects, his comment was echoed by all of the commentators, who suggested that the level of abstraction of treatment packages (manuals) is generally too high to be useful scientifically as a causal construct, given that most manuals reflect so many a priori decisions (about length of treatment, mix of interventions, timing of interventions, etc.) that the only way to know what is useful, inert, or iatrogenic in them (or what might be modified to render them more useful) is to dismantle. Once one dismantles, however, one returns to the study of intervention strategies, which, along with principles of change, seem to us a more useful level of analysis than treatment manuals viewed as prescriptive "packages" for training and practice.
A second point with which we concur is that nothing in the nature of RCT methodology requires a focus on disorders as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) . This is particularly true if the goal is to test principles of change, such as those suggested by Goldfried and Eubanks-Carter (2004;  e.g., exposing patients to things they fear, helping patients do or experience something different, fostering insight, or testing one's beliefs). Matters get complicated, however, if one is interested in identifying and studying intervention strategies or principles of change believed to be relatively specific to particular forms of psychopathology, such as depression, posttraumatic responses, or eating disorders. It is easy at such moments to default to DSM-IV categories, as in the suggestion that researchers develop treatments for adjustment disorders and not otherwise specified (NOS) disorders. The problem is that these disorders tend to be artifacts of a categorical classification system that creates heterogeneous categories for patients who fall between the cracks (e.g., who do not quite meet criteria for several different anxiety disorders). We doubt that adjustment disorder has any genuine properties that would allow development of a coherent manual, or that a manual could be developed for most NOS conditions, because these categories tend to be defined by the absence of criteria that would allow the patient to cross thresholds for bona fide disorders rather than by the presence of any shared features.
For example, several studies have shown that eating disorder NOS is a highly heterogeneous category that includes a mixture of relatively healthy patients who do not quite meet criteria for either anorexia or bulimia nervosa and relatively sick patients who are polysymptomatic, have severe personality pathology, and have simply not "specialized" in any one Axis I syndrome (e.g., Wonderlich & Mitchell, 1997) . The approach frequently advocated is to develop manuals for anorexia nervosa, bulimia nervosa, eating disorder NOS, borderline personality disorder, and obsessivecompulsive personality disorder, and simply apply them sequentially to patients with more than one problem. We suspect a more fruitful approach would be to develop principles and strategies for treating anorexic symptoms, for treating bulimic symptoms, and for treating the most prevalent personality styles or domains of personality dysfunction in patients with eating disorders, which are often systematically related to these symptoms (such as emotional constriction and restrictive eating; see Westen & Harnden-Fischer, 2001 ) and to present clinicians with the best available evidence on main effects and interactions as the data come in. The goal would not be to prescribe sequential manuals designed for patients carefully selected for minimal overlap among syndromes, whose pathology may be very different from less pure patients. Rather, the goal would be to provide clinicians with data on the kinds of interventions that are associated with relative success or failure in treating particular problems so that they can integrate them over time as the issues emerge in treatment, at least until systematic large-sample studies have shown that particular sequencing or combinations of interventions are more or less useful for particular kinds of patients receiving treatment for eating disorders.
A third issue Haaga (2004) raised is the possibility that the problems with external validity we outlined in our article (Westen et al., 2004) may not be as severe as they appear, citing a recent study by Stirman, DeRubeis, Crits-Christoph, and Brody (2003) that attempted to address (as stated in its abstract) "the extent to which published randomized controlled trials . . . can be generalized to a sample of community outpatients" (p. 963). Our reading of this article, and of similar efforts to resolve the question of generalizability of ESTs without running new RCTs (described in Westen et al., 2004) , is somewhat less sanguine. Stirman and colleagues used a creative design to examine the extent to which exclusion criteria in RCTs limited their applicability to the treatment of a random sample of 347 randomly selected HMO patients. They relied primarily on clinicians' diagnoses of primary and secondary disorders in patients' records to determine the extent to which patients would meet criteria for any published RCT for 10 widely studied disorders. They found that 67% of patients would not meet criteria for any RCT for any disorder (primary or secondary), primarily because they had diagnoses such as adjustment disorder (nearly one third of the sample), for which there are no ESTs (and for which, as we suggest above, there can be no ESTs, because people with adjustment disorders are adjusting to many different things).
Having found that most of the excluded patients were excluded for this reason, Stirman et al. (2003) then set out to test whether the results of ESTs would at least generalize to patients treated for disorders for which ESTs are available. Unfortunately, a number of design and data-analytic decisions rendered the data they reported difficult to interpret. The authors used clinicians' chart diagnoses as the primary data to compare against published inclusion-exclusion criteria to determine whether patients had comorbid conditions that would limit their entrance into RCTs. The available evidence is clear, however, that what clinicians report in such records is very limited, in part to avoid stigmatizing patients and in part because they tend not to diagnose comorbidity in the same way as the structured interviews used in RCTs (Zimmerman & Mattia, 2001 ). For example, only 7 patients (2% of the sample) received a personality disorder diagnosis. This contrasts with Axis II comorbidity rates in the range of 40%-60% in general clinical samples, when clinicians are free to make confidential diagnoses (not in the charts) or when patients are assessed with structured interviews (e.g., Brieger, Ehrt, Bloeink, & Marneros, 2002; Westen & Arkowitz-Westen, 1998) . Equally striking were other symptoms not found in the patients' records. For example, among patients with major depression (n ϭ 94), only 3 were coded as positive for suicidality, 3 were coded with serious enough problems with substance use to exclude them from RCTs, and none was coded with borderline personality disorder. These numbers do not resemble any clinical sample of which we are aware, and they would even be low for an undergraduate sample of students meeting major depression criteria.
Furthermore, Stirman et al.'s (2003) method of operationalizing generalizability of RCTs was to code whether patients in the sample would have been included in at least one clinical trial for an EST (or in secondary analyses, at least two RCTs). Thus, whereas their goal was to address the extent to which the results of RCTs can be generalized to patients in everyday practice, their analyses actually answered a different question: What percentage of patients in clinical practice could get themselves into some RCT somewhere. The authors concluded that the results of RCTs are generalizable to 80% of the patients in the sample with diagnoses for which there are ESTs because 80% of such patients could match to at least one RCT for their primary disorder (and 70% to at least two RCTs). Even setting aside the underreporting of comorbidity, the fact that a patient might meet inclusion criteria for one RCT out of the dozens conducted for disorders such as depression does not address questions about the generalizability of the conclusions being widely disseminated about ESTs, as summarized in reviews and meta-analyses. These conclusions reflect claims about a large corpus of literature for these disorders, not isolated instances. A more appropriate strategy for answering the question they set out to address might have been to examine the extent to which patients would have met criteria for the modal RCT for the target disorder (which would not be difficult to identify; see Westen & Morrison, 2001) . Stirman et al. (2003) next attempted to answer the charge of critics that studies of ESTs have systematically excluded difficult or polysymptomatic cases. They reported that of the 87 patients in the sample with comorbid diagnoses, "56 (64%) matched with at least one study for their primary diagnosis, their secondary diagnosis, or both" (Stirman et al., 2003, p. 967) . What the authors are thus saying is that among these comorbid cases, two thirds could get into some RCT somewhere for something, or as Haaga (2004) described it, most patients have some problem such that the ESTfollowing therapist would not go empty handed. But the real question is what percentage of patients would go empty handed for their primary concerns if their therapist relied on the EST literature. The authors unfortunately did not report the percentage of these comorbid patients who could be treated for their primary disorder on the basis of the EST literature, even using the low threshold of a single RCT.
We describe this study in some detail because it is the latest of a host of recent studies designed to show that the exclusion rates of the past 20 years are actually irrelevant to generalizability and hence that they pose no real threat to widespread conclusions about treatment of choice that have changed the landscape of clinical training and practice. We recommend caution regarding the potential for confirmatory biases in design and reporting of studies addressing a question for which the stakes are so high and the likelihood of either/or answers is so low (ESTs are generalizable/ ESTs are not generalizable). It is difficult to imagine that researchers have imposed restrictive exclusion criteria that threaten generalizability for 2 decades when they could just as easily have not done so and gotten the same results. There is nothing in the nature of depression, either scientifically or ethically, that should render patients with borderline features, substance abuse, or prominent anxiety symptoms ineligible for treatment-unless, of course, the treatment was not designed to address the complications those clinical characteristics pose (and was in fact expressly designed to address a single focus). In hindsight, the imposition of restrictive exclusion criteria was probably a terrible methodological mistake. It has cast doubt on the clinical applicability of 2 decades of research, much of which is probably applicable to some substantial minority of patients. As suggested below, the problem is readily remediable if as a field we focus the next generation of RCTs on large unrestricted samples and moderator analyses.
Haaga (2004) raised a fourth, and highly appropriate, issue about the potential limitations of the research strategy we outlined, which would use correlational analyses of the relation between process and outcome in large naturalistic samples to identify promising interventions worth testing experimentally. In particular, he noted a highly relevant set of articles (Stiles, 1988; Stiles & Shapiro, 1994) that argued that therapist responsiveness to specific patient needs can alter the extent to which the therapist appears to use particular techniques and hence distort process-outcome correlations. We have no all-purpose answer to this criticism, which is a genuine concern, but we suspect several factors can mitigate the problem. First and foremost, investigators can avoid problems associated with restricted range by testing a wide range of intervention and process variables over a long span of time (e.g., outcome at 1, 2, and 5 years). It is difficult to imagine that if genuine differences in outcome exist at 5 years between a highly active didactic approach such as CBT and a more exploratory approach such as psychodynamic psychotherapy, such process variables will be swamped by therapist responsiveness. Ablon's work (see Ablon & Marci, 2004) suggests that focusing on constellations of variables, such as the extent to which a treatment resembles a CBT prototype, may prove particularly useful in this regard.
Second, patient variables need to be measured carefully, including both personality and response to particular kinds of interventions in treatment, so that these variables can be treated as moderators of the relation between interventions and outcome. Just as one may search to identify prototypes of successful treatment in patients for whom depression is a salient complaint using an instrument such as the Psychotherapy Q Set (Jones, Cumming, & Pulos, 1993) , one can identify prototypes of patients who are likely to respond well or poorly to different kinds of therapeutic interventions using personality instruments such as the SWAP-200 Q-Sort (Westen & Shedler, 1999) .
Third, as Ablon and Marci (2004) stressed in their commentary, measuring not only the "what" and "how" of interventions but the interpersonal process created by the interaction of patient and therapist tends to yield strong and meaningful correlations between what transpires in sessions and therapeutic outcome. In this respect, parsing the data into relatively broad units (e.g., whole sessions or sets of sessions) may yield stronger correlations than parsing behavior into specific interactions or "turns."
Fourth, therapist responsiveness or attunement should be a measured variable in its own right, which is likely to predict outcome, just as maternal attunement or responsiveness is measurable and predicts attachment status and its developmental sequelae in children. Responsiveness ϫ Intervention interactions may be particularly important variables to include in regression analyses (or build into item sets of process instruments) because they factor in both what transpired and how well it met the patient's needs at the time.
Finally, Stiles's (1988; Stiles & Shapiro, 1994) argument suggests the importance of longitudinal assessment of therapeutic interventions and process over time, beginning with careful assessment of therapist-patient interactions in the first few weeks of treatment (during which the dyad negotiates an alliance). It may be, for example, that ways of intervening and interacting with patients in the first part of a treatment for bulimia nervosa or depression that are helpful will become less useful or even counterproductive over time and that what constitutes the "first part of treatment" may depend in part on patient variables such as ability to reflect on alternative perspectives or patient-therapist interaction variables such as the extent to which an atmosphere facilitating trust and open engagement has been established. Finally, Haaga (2004) , with his obviously honed clinical skills, sniffed out our hypothesis that longer term therapies may hold promise for addressing some problems, disorders, or diatheses but cautioned that cost considerations be addressed from the start. Our own suspicion is that the methodology of ESTs has, for reasons delineated in the target article, prevented researchers from examining not only traditional longer term therapies but also integrative treatments that address both current states and diatheses and hence hold particular promise. Testing such treatments seems to us an extremely important research agenda for the next 2 decades, before therapists who practice longer term treatments have disappeared from the empirically supported landscape. We are not assuming that such treatments will outperform others, but we do believe they are long overdue for systematic testing. Although we would agree with Haaga regarding the importance of assessing the cost of such treatments (and their potential offsets in medical utilization; see, e.g., Gabbard & Kay, 2001) , we believe at this point researchers would do well to learn how best to treat debilitating disorders such as depression and to figure out the most cost-effective ways to deploy and refine them later. Adult-onset diabetes and asthma are no more threatening in terms of morbidity and mortality than depression, anorexia nervosa, and borderline personality disorder, but the standard practice is to try to develop efficacious treatments first and figure out how to pay for them, or how to balance costs and benefits, once researchers know what works. As mental health researchers, we should be careful to avoid cultural devaluations of the personal and social costs of disorders of mind and brain and vigorously pursue treatments that work.
What Is to Be Done?
In both the target article and the commentaries, several suggestions have emerged as to how we might proceed as a field to build on the tremendous progress over decades of treatment research, both substantively and methodologically, and to begin addressing some of the problems with which we are now confronted. We have made three proposals. The first is to focus in RCTs, as Haaga (2004) suggested, on the assessment of high-priority intervention variables, as well as on therapeutic strategies and mechanisms of change, as emphasized by Goldfried and Eubanks-Carter (2004) . The second, echoed by Haaga, is to require a quality of reporting of RCTs in journals that maximizes their potential value to the field, to scientifically minded clinicians, and ultimately to patients. The third, emphasized by Ablon and Marci (2004) , is to apply correlational designs to treatments in the community to identify potentially promising treatment strategies and process variables and to triangulate on scientifically and clinically meaningful findings that can guide clinical practice, particularly where the assumptions of EST methodology are substantially violated.
Such suggestions, even if widely accepted in one form or another, could not be implemented in a vacuum. They would require substantial leadership from the NIMH, which supports much of the psychotherapy research in the United States and sets the agenda, directly or indirectly, for psychotherapy research in much of the world. We thus offer the following recommendations.
One of the primary limitations on the applicability of psychotherapy research to everyday practice is the exclusive focus on categorical DSM-defined disorders. Such a focus is sometimes reasonable and appropriate but can be an impediment to research of maximum relevance to patients and clinicians. The percentage of patients who present primarily with DSM-defined disorders is unknown, but it is clear that most patients who seek treatment have subthreshold conditions or problems that are not readily classified and hence fall between the cracks of existing treatment research (e.g., Stirman et al., 2003) . We would therefore recommend, first, that NIMH issue a program announcement (PA) for needs assessment research examining precisely what brings most patients into treatment.
Second, the default for research on the treatment of problems such as depression should be inclusion of subthreshold as well as threshold cases to see whether the two groups treated categorically differ in treatment response and whether, when the disorder is assessed continuously, outcome is moderated by severity. In other words, treatments should be developed for spectrum diagnosesdepression, panic, generalized anxiety, and so forth-unless basic science data suggest that the disorders are genuinely taxonic and that DSM-IV diagnostic thresholds for categorical diagnosis distinguish taxonic from nontaxonic cases. Researchers who wish to study only patients who cross diagnostic thresholds that eliminate most patients who suffer from a given problem should need to justify such a decision.
Third, although the descriptive nature of psychiatric diagnosis since the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) has been essential for the development of valid, reliable, and pantheoretically usable diagnostic groupings, clinicians of all theoretical perspectives who practice psychotherapy necessarily take a functional stance if they want to help patients change. We would therefore recommend that, alongside traditional research on DSMdefined disorders and spectrum-related problems, NIMH issue a PA for treatments that explicitly target functions and areas of dysfunction such as emotion regulation, self-esteem regulation, impulse regulation, and interpersonal patterns that may cut across diagnostic groupings. Given the clear evidence that personality processes constitute a diathesis for most Axis I syndromes, such a PA should explicitly target personality processes.
Brief treatments have proven a failure in terms of long-term outcome for many disorders. One should therefore neither assume nor expect that treatments of complex problems-for example, depression, anorexia nervosa, battering, personality disorderswill be brief. We recommend that researchers who propose brief treatments carefully justify this decision, either on the grounds of prior research showing that the target symptoms are among those likely to respond to brief interventions or on the basis of pilot data suggesting positive long-term outcome. The default for RCTs should be a study in which the investigators test two or three different lengths of the same treatment. For many disorders, this would provide the equivalent of an active control condition and would obviate the need for intent-to-fail conditions that provide minimal useful information (given that something intended to be therapeutic is usually substantially better than a non-bona fide sparring partner; see Wampold et al., 1997) .
Changes are essential in the primary funding mechanisms used to support psychotherapy research. The exploratory treatment grant (R34) mechanism, which was originally designed to foster creative and innovative treatments (B. E. Wolfe, personal communication, March 2000), has evolved into a counterproductive gatekeeper mechanism, in which researchers must first answer the scientifically meaningless question of whether their treatment outperforms something inert (which it will likely do by virtue of experimenter enthusiasm alone) before graduating to a "real" grant 3 years later. The 3-year limit on the R34 mechanism also prevents the testing of anything but brief treatments, regardless of the requisites of the disorder. The R01 mechanism, which is the primary support mechanism for large-scale studies, needs to be extendable, perhaps with a streamlined peer review mechanism, to 7 years from the current 5, so researchers can test longer term treatments and outcome at extended intervals. No study should be fundable that does not include follow-up at a minimum of 2 years.
One of the greatest threats to the internal validity of findings from RCTs is investigator allegiance. Proposals should be considered scientifically unacceptable that do not include a dissenter (someone neither hostile nor favorable to the treatment under consideration) among the ranks of coinvestigators or active consultants. Inclusion of a dissenter was one of the central recommendations that came out of the "groupthink" literature in social psychology in the 1960s and 1970s (Janis, 1988) and seems particularly apt given the data on investigator allegiance. The dissenter should be expected to review the study design, periodically observe what is happening at the site, and review the most important data analyses and manuscripts to come out of the project with the jaundiced eye of a disbeliever. Where the dissenter has serious concerns about the ultimate presentation of the findings, he or she should be routinely invited by journal editors to add a brief addendum at the end of the published article.
The greatest threat to the external validity of findings from RCTs, aside from inclusion criteria that focus exclusively on DSM-defined disorders with diagnostic thresholds lacking strong empirical support, is the high rate of exclusion of patients for comorbid conditions. Proposals should be considered scientifically unacceptable if they impose any exclusion criteria other than those a reasonable clinician would use in everyday practice, just as they are considered unacceptable if they do not adequately address minority and gender representation. Moderator analyses should be clearly specified, and potentially relevant variables such as personality and psychotherapy process variables should be adequately assessed. Funding limits should be adjusted to reflect the increased sample sizes required for such research, and multisite investigations should be encouraged in cases in which sample size is likely to be a concern.
NIMH should convene a conference on the use of naturalistic samples and correlational designs in psychotherapy research, issue a PA for such research, and create a permanent study section to review relevant proposals. Studies making use of clinical practice to develop and test treatments in naturalistic settings should be distinguished from studies designed to test laboratory-derived ESTs in the community (the current understanding of effectiveness research). The latter should be reviewed by RCT methodologists in study sections already constituted, whereas the former should be reviewed by researchers knowledgeable about and invested in alternative designs.
Finally, the intended consumers of psychotherapy researchand perhaps the most underappreciated potential contributors to it-are practicing clinicians. The best way to ensure that treatment research is relevant to treatment in everyday practice is to include a full-time clinician as a reviewer of every treatment proposal reviewed by NIMH (as currently occurs with some, but not all, proposals). (Similar clinician review of basic science would likely maximize its relevance as well.) We would not expect clinician reviewers to have the skills to address methodological or statistical details in the same way as full-time researchers who have distinguished themselves for their research competence and productivity. But the time has come to recognize that we similarly cannot expect full-time researchers to recognize and anticipate all the clinical implications or limitations of treatments designed to guide clinical practice.
